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FOREWORD: THE ROBERTS COURT IN  
2013–14—LOOKING BEYOND THE RHETORIC 
Evan Gerstmann∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2013–14 Term was eventful, with major 
decisions in the areas of freedom of speech, the Fourth Amendment, 
separation of church and state, freedom of religion, gun control, the 
death penalty, affirmative action, and women’s access to 
contraceptives, among other hot button issues. Taking a close look at 
the term, two things stand out. First, the Court’s decisions as a whole 
were far more balanced in terms of liberal and conservative results 
than much of the media coverage would suggest. Second, despite the 
overall balance, the Court continues to turn a deaf ear to many of the 
concerns of racial and religious minorities, women, and those 
concerned with the influence of the wealthy on elections. These blind 
spots might account for the perhaps overstated perception of the 
Court’s conservatism. This forward will discuss both of these 
∗  Evan Gerstmann is Professor of Political Science at Loyola Marymount University and a
Professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison (1996) and a J.D. from The University of Michigan Law School (cum laude, 
1986). He is the author of two books on constitutional law: Same-Sex Marriage and the 
Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2003, 2008) and The Constitutional Underclass: 
Gays, Lesbians and the Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection (University of Chicago Press, 
1999) as well as the co-editor of a third book: Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New Century: 
How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech. (Stanford University 
Press, 2006). Among his other publications are “Where is Equal Protection? Applying Strict 
Scrutiny to Use of Race by Law Enforcement,” Harvard Journal of Racial and Ethnic Justice 
(2013), “Litigating Same-Sex Marriage: Might the Courts Actually be Bastions of rationality?,” 
PS: Political Science and Politics (April 2005), and, “We are the World? What United States 
Courts Can and Should Learn from the Law and Politics of Other Western Nations,” Journal of 
International Law and International Relations (Fall 2005). 
He is interested in broad range of legal and constitutional issues and his work has been widely 
reviewed and cited in federal and state court decisions on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, 
in scholarly journals such as The Yale Law Journal, The Harvard Law Review, and The University of 
Chicago Law Review, as well as in national journals such as The New York Review of Books, The New 
Republic, The Washington Post, The Nation and The Chronicle of Higher Education.  
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observations, and conclude with some thoughts on the Court’s future 
direction. 
A. The Court’s Ideological Balance
There is good reason to be cautious about using terms like 
“liberal” or “conservative” to describe the outcomes of complicated 
legal cases. Likewise, there is good reason to avoid talking about the 
views of “the Court” as a whole, given that its decisions are product 
of the writings of nine very different Justices. However, the media 
often writes about the Supreme Court as an ideological institution 
and much of that coverage depicts the Roberts Court as aggressively 
conservative. The New York Times’s Adam Liptak has written that 
the “Court Under Roberts is the Most Conservative in Decades.”1 
According to Slate’s Dahlia Lithwik, “The Roberts Court is really, 
really conservative.”2 Nate Silver went even further, writing that the 
“Supreme Court May Be [the] Most Conservative in Modern 
History.”3 MSNBC’s Adam Serwer recently warned: “Don’t Be 
Fooled, the Supreme Court Is Still Very Conservative.”4 Bloomberg 
Business Week has described Justice Roberts as “The Chief 
Conservative Strategist.”5 The New York Times Editorial Board 
asserted that the word “conservative,” was inadequate to describe the 
right-ward direction of the Court and editorialized that the Supreme 
Court is “radical” and “calls to mind the defiance of the Court in the 
1930s when it regularly struck down the New Deal Statutes during 
the Great Depression.”6 Ian Millhiser, of The Center for American 
1. Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html. 
2. Dahlia Lithwick, How the Supreme Court Changed America This Year: Nineteen Legal
Thinkers Run Down the Court’s Most Important Decisions, POLITICO MAG. (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/how-the-supreme-court-changed-america-this 
-year-108497.html.
3. Nate Silver, Supreme Court May Be Most Conservative in Modern History, N.Y. TIMES
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2012), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/supreme
-court-may-be-most-conservative-inmodern-history/.
4. Adam Serwer, Don’t Be Fooled, the Supreme Court Is Still Very Conservative, MSNBC
(Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/dont-be-fooled-the-supreme-court-still-v. 
5. Paul M. Barrett, John Roberts, Chief Conservative Strategist, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10,
2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-04-10/john-roberts-leads-supreme-court 
-shift-to-the-right.
6. The Radical Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/opinion/sunday/the-radical-supreme-court.html. 
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Progress, advised liberal and progressive advocacy groups to simply 
“stay away from the Supreme Court.”7 
Yet a more careful look at the Court’s most recent term suggests 
that the Roberts Court deserves a second look. While it is possible 
that the 2013–14 Term was aberrational, it was actually a remarkably 
balanced term with regard to the number of liberal and conservative 
results. In order to take a fresh look at the Court’s ideology, I 
eschewed reliance on other people’s database and looked through all 
seventy three cases that produced opinions on the merits and counted 
twenty-one that could be characterized as having liberal outcome and 
an equal number that could be characterized as conservative, with the 
balance being opinions that could not be characterized one way or 
the other. With some exceptions, outcomes were considered liberal if 
they favored criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs, broadly 
interpreted gun control statutes or allowed regulation of pollution, 
limited the death penalty, or, in certain cases, protected freedom of 
speech. Outcomes were considered conservative if they favored 
police, prosecution or civil defendants, frustrated the rights claims of 
racial or religious minorities or women, or limited government power 
either to reign in campaign donations or to protect the environment. 
There is of course some degree of subjectivity in this. I declined 
to list either Bond v. United States8 or NLRB v. Noel Canning9 as 
either liberal or conservative because they gave both liberals and 
conservatives some of what they wanted. I listed 
McCullen v. Coakley10 as conservative even though one could argue 
that a decision protecting protestors’ free speech rights is liberal and 
also because the Court could have gone significantly further than it 
did to limit protections against harassment of women seeking 
abortions. 
Nevertheless, even accounting for the fact that there is always 
room for argument about how to ideologically characterize a case, 
the Court’s 2013–14 Term was remarkably ideologically balanced. 
Nor is it clear that the liberal decisions were less important than the 
conservative ones, although these are also somewhat subjective 
7. Ian Millhiser, Liberals Just Need to Stay Away from the Supreme Court, SLATE (May 21,
2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/when_will_liberal
s_learn_to_stay_the_heck_away_from_the_supreme_court.html. 
8. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
9. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
10. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
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judgments. The liberal decisions were many and varied, and quite a 
few were of great importance. In EPA v. EME Homer City,11 the 
Court broadly interpreted the power of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate cross-state air pollution. Cass Sunstein 
wrote that it “may well be the most important Supreme Court 
decision of the 2013 term” because of the “massive public health 
benefits” of the EPA rule that was upheld and because the decision 
“strongly affirmed the EPA’s authority.”12 According to Sunstein the 
decision “largely affirmed the agency’s authority to [regulate 
greenhouse gases].”13 Given the great importance of climate change, 
and the probable lack of action by Congress in the foreseeable future, 
the decision is of great importance.14 
In the same term, the Court issued two decisions broadly 
interpreting important federal gun control statutes. In 
Abramski v. United States,15 the Court held that a purchaser of a 
firearm must reveal if he is purchasing it for another person even if 
that other person could have legally purchased that firearm himself.16 
The decision will allow the federal government’s complex system of 
background checks to function more effectively, which is an 
important result given that Congress is as unlikely to pass new gun 
control legislation in the future as it is to pass new protections for the 
environment. 
In another major gun control decision, the Court broadly 
interpreted a statute barring any person convicted of a “misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence” from possessing a gun.17 A number of 
lower courts had interpreted that statute narrowly, allowing some 
domestic abusers to continue to possess firearms.18 The Supreme 
11. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).




14. During the same term, the Court also decided Utility Air Regulation v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). This is a harder decision to characterize because it 
contains some language harshly criticizing the breadth of the EPA’s argument but, as a practical 
matter, it upheld the agency’s “regulatory authority over all but three percent of the stationary 
sources” it claimed power over. Clean Air Act—Stationary Source Greenhouse Gas Regulation—
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 128 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (2014). 
15. Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014).
16. Id. at 2263.
17. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
18. Id. at 1410.
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Court held that “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” should be 
broadly interpreted to include violent actions often characterized as 
mere “offensive touching.” The case was hailed as a “landmark 
opinion” by Lynn Rosenthal, the White House Advisor on Violence 
Against Women.19 
Perhaps the best known liberal decision of the term was the 
Court’s unanimous decision in Riley v. California,20 which held that 
the police must obtain a warrant in order to search digital 
information on the cell phone of a person who has been arrested.21 
The case was notable for its breadth of protection of electronic 
privacy. As described by SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston: 
The ruling was such a sweeping embrace of digital privacy 
that it even reached remotely stored private information that 
can be reached by a hand-held device—as in the modern-
day data storage “cloud.” And it implied that the tracking 
data that a cell phone may contain about the places that an 
individual visited also is entitled to the same shield of 
privacy. 
The Court’s ruling drew some suggestions by Justice 
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to narrow its scope, but it did not 
accept those. The result was the broadest constitutional 
ruling on privacy in the face of modern technology since the 
Court’s ruling two Terms ago limiting police use of 
satellite-linked GPS tracking of a suspect’s movements by 
car.22 
In addition to Riley, the Court shored up constitutional and 
statutory protections in the criminal justice area in numerous other 
cases. It broadened the grounds for claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel, overruled a state supreme court decision that narrowly 
interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause, overruled the Eighth 
Circuit’s broad application of penalty enhancement under the 
19. Lynn Rosenthal, Supreme Court Decision in U.S. v. Castleman Will Save Women’s
Lives, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014, 2:23 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/03/28/supreme-court-decision-us-v-castleman-will-save 
-womens-lives.
20. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
21. Id. at 2495.
22. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Broad Cloak of Privacy for Cellphones,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion 
-analysis-broad-cloak-of-privacy-for-cellphones/.
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Controlled Substances Act, and held that a person cannot be found to 
have aided and abetted a violent crime or drug crime involving a 
firearm unless the defendant had advance knowledge of their 
confederate’s possession of a firearm that gave them a realistic 
opportunity to quit the crime.23 In addition, the Court extended its 
series of rulings restricting the application of the death penalty by 
holding that states cannot simply assume that a person with an IQ 
above seventy has the mental incapacity that would allow the 
imposition of capital punishment.24 
The Supreme Court’s free speech cases were also remarkably 
balanced this past term. This is an especially difficult area in which 
to dichotomously label decisions as liberal or conservative, but the 
Court issued four decisions that would be best described as 
conservative and an equal number that could best be described as 
liberal. This is based on the admittedly contestable assumption that 
decisions that expand protection for free speech should be considered 
liberal if they do not open the door to domination of political 
campaigns by wealthy individuals or corporations and if they do not 
undermine access to medical facilities. 
As noted, in the 2013–14 Term the Court decided four cases that 
are best described as liberal by these criteria. Two of those cases, one 
statutory, the other constitutional, affirmed and broadened free 
speech protections for employees. In Lawson v. FMR,25 the Court 
broadly interpreted the whistle-blower protection section of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.26 It held that the section’s protections 
extend to employees of non-public contractors of publicly traded 
companies.27 In doing so it overruled the lower court, which had 
emphasized that the caption of the section read “Whistleblower 
Protection for Employees of Publicly Traded Companies.”28 
Although the language of the statute is ambiguous, the Court opted to 
interpret it an expansive manner. Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting 
opinion, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel Alito 
23. Respectively, Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014); Martinez v. Illinois, 134 S. Ct.
2070 (2014); Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014); Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. 
Ct. 1240 (2014). 
24. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
25. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).
26. Id. at 1161.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1169.
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highlighted the “stunning reach” of the majority decision: “By 
interpreting a statute that already protects an expansive class of 
conduct also to cover a large class of employees, today’s opinion 
threatens to subject private companies to a costly new front of 
employment litigation.”29 
In Lane v. Franks,30 the Court re-affirmed the vitality of 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District,31 
which protects the rights of government employees to speak out as 
citizens on matters of public affairs.32 Pickering had been 
significantly restricted in application by a 2006 case, 
Garcetti v. Ceballos,33 which held that “when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes.”34 
A government employee, Edward Lane, testified under oath 
about fraud in a government program and claimed that he was the 
victim of retaliation as result of that testimony.35 The district court, 
applying Garcetti, held that he enjoyed no First Amendment 
protection because he testified about information that he learned as a 
result of his government employment.36 Such a rule would severely 
constrict the First Amendment protections of the Pickering decision, 
since it would strip protection from any employee who learned of 
government wrongdoing during the course of his or her employment. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding: 
Speech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the 
heart of the First Amendment, which “was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about 
of political and social changes desired by the people[.]” 
This remains true when speech concerns information related 
to or learned through public employment. After all, public 
employees do not renounce their citizenship when they 
accept employment, and this Court has cautioned time and 
again that public employers may not condition employment 
29. Lawson, 134 S. Ct. at 1184 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
30. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
31. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
32. Id. at 565.
33. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
34. Id. at 410.
35. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
36. Id. at 2376.
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on the relinquishment of constitutional rights. There is 
considerable value, moreover, in encouraging, rather than 
inhibiting, speech by public employees. For “[g]overnment 
employees are often in the best position to know what ails 
the agencies for which they work.” “The interest at stake is 
as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion 
as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.”37 
The Court issued two other decisions protecting free speech. In 
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus38 it reversed a lower court 
decision that had dismissed a pre-enforcement challenge to a 
restrictive regulation of campaign speech.39 The Ohio statute 
provided for a criminal punishment of up to six months in jail and a 
fine of up to $5,000 for campaign literature or advertisements that 
say anything known to be false about a candidate’s voting record. 
The law also assigned regulatory power to police “false statements” 
to the Ohio Elections Commission.40 The decision was important not 
only in the free speech context—the law was eventually struck down 
on First Amendment grounds—but also for its liberal application of 
the rules of standing for a facial challenge to a law. 
Perhaps most controversially, the Court held in 
Paroline v. United States41 that a single possessor of child 
pornography could not be held liable for all of the damages to the 
victim of that pornography.42 Over the dissent of three justices, the 
Court held that the victim was entitled to recover some damages 
from each possessor.43 Paroline is a good example of how difficult it 
can be to characterize decisions as liberal or conservative. Justice 
Sotomayor wrote a lone dissent arguing that the victim should be 
able to recover all of her damages from Paroline, but Justices 
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas all would have ruled that the victim 
should have received nothing: 
I certainly agree with the Court that Amy deserves 
restitution, and that Congress—by making restitution 
mandatory for victims of child pornography—meant that 
37. Id. at 2377 (internal citations omitted).
38. 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2006).
39. Id. at 2341.
40. Id. at 2338.
41. 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014).
42. Id. at 1725–26.
43. Id. at 1718–22.
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she have it. Unfortunately, the restitution statute that 
Congress wrote for child pornography offenses makes it 
impossible to award that relief to Amy in this case. Instead 
of tailoring the statute to the unique harms caused by child 
pornography, Congress borrowed a generic restitution 
standard that makes restitution contingent on the 
Government’s ability to prove, “by the preponderance of 
the evidence,” “the amount of the loss sustained by a victim 
as a result of” the defendant’s crime. When it comes to 
Paroline’s crime—possession of two of Amy’s images—it 
is not possible to do anything more than pick an arbitrary 
number for that “amount.” And arbitrary is not good enough 
for the criminal law.44 
Reasonable people can disagree, but certainly a strong argument 
can be made that the five-justice majority opinion produced a liberal 
result by providing for restitution despite flaws in the statute, without 
completely tossing aside principles of proportionality in punishment 
and liability. 
Of course this review of the Court’s most recent term is 
suggestive rather than conclusive. Perhaps the term was an island of 
balance in a sea of judicial conservative activism. It is also possible 
that the Court’s overall case selection has changed so that many 
lower court cases with conservative outcomes have gone unreviewed 
by the Supreme Court. That is possible, but far from self-evident, and 
certainly has not been demonstrated. 
It is also worth noting that the Court passed up a number of 
opportunities to issue conservative decisions that would have had 
broad impact but chose instead to write opinions that are far more 
modest in scope. For example, in Harris v. Quinn,45 the Court ruled 
that personal assistants hired under a state Medicaid program to help 
patients with in-home care could not be required to pay union dues.46 
There was a widespread belief that the continued vitality of the case 
holding that public employees could be required to pay union dues, 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,47 was in question.48 Instead, 
44. Id. at 1730 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
45. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
46. Id. at 2627–44.
47. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
48. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: A Ruling Inviting a Plea to Overrule, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 30, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/opinion-analysis-a-ruling-inviting-a-plea 
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the Court declined to overrule Abood and issued a narrow ruling 
based on the narrow facts of the case—the personal assistants were 
hired primarily by the patients, not the State, did not get many of the 
union-negotiated benefits such as pensions, and had their salaries set 
by statute rather than by collective bargaining.49 
Similarly, in Bond, the Court had an opportunity to rein in 
federal power under the Treaty Clause, by overruling or limiting a 
1920 case, Missouri v. Holland,50 which had expansively interpreted 
federal power under that clause.51 The facts on Bond were somewhat 
bizarre: an aggrieved wife attempted to take revenge on her 
husband’s pregnant mistress by applying a chemical substance to 
various surfaces the mistress might touch.52 She succeeded in 
causing a minor injury that could be treated by applying water to the 
wound.53 The state declined to bring charges for the assault; yet the 
federal authorities chose to prosecute her pursuant to a federal law 
implementing the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction.54 
Three Justices—Scalia, Thomas, Alito—wrote a concurring 
opinion that would have drastically reduced federal authority to enact 
legislation under the Treaty Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.55 The other six Justices declined their invitation to scale back 
Missouri v. Holland and instead wrote a narrow decision of statutory 
interpretation holding the treaty did not apply to the crime at issue.56 
While there is certainly no definitive evidence that the Court 
does not eventually intend to use recent precedents such as National 
-to-overrule/ (“In fact both sides in the Harris case had made the future of the Abood precedent
the focus of their debate in this case.”). 
49. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634–38.
50. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
51. Id. at 435.
52. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2081.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2080.
55. Id. at 2094.
56. The Bond Court did indicate some skepticism about whether the Treaty Power could
extend to purely local crimes, but did not rule on that question. See Ilya Somin, Thoughts on 
Bond v. United States, WASH. POST VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/02/thoughts-on-bond-v 
-united-states/ (“Therefore the majority opinion at least suggests that there are serious doubts
about whether the treaty power can reach local crimes like those committed by Bond. That
doesn’t mean that the majority justices clearly conclude that it does not reach it. They did
ultimately avoid that issue, after all. But it at least hints in that direction.”).
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius57 (which upheld the 
Affordable Care Act as an exercise of the Tax Power, but held that 
the Commerce Power of Congress does not extend to requiring 
people to purchase health insurance) to further rein in federal power 
in the future,58 Bond is a reminder that such speculation is just that—
speculation. With its strange facts and seeming federal overreach, it 
would be difficult to imagine a better vehicle for the Court to 
constrain federal power than Bond, yet the Court declined to do so. 
It has been suggested that the Roberts Court’s brand of 
conservatism is more of the libertarian variety than it is socially 
conservative, which might account for liberal-seeming decisions 
such as Riley and the other criminal procedure cases.59 If these cases 
are really more libertarian than liberal this might account for the 
perception that the Court consistently rules in a conservative manner. 
However, this would be an incomplete explanation at best. The 
Court’s decisions in Homer City, Abramski, Castleman, and 
Hall v. Florida60 all had outcomes in keeping with traditional liberal 
views on environmental regulation, gun control, and the death 
penalty. None of these cases could reasonably be described as 
libertarian. 
One could also argue that the Court’s conservative decisions are 
somehow more sweeping or impactful than the liberal decisions so 
that the simple counting of liberal and conservative opinions misses 
the forest for the trees. That is possible, but any such analysis would 
involve a lot of comparisons between apples and oranges. Is a 
decision making it easier for states to elect to limit affirmative action 
more sweeping or impactful than a decision making it easier for the 
EPA to limit cross-state pollution? Is a decision limiting protection 
of women seeking abortions from harassment more significant than a 
decision limiting access to guns by persons convicted for domestic 
violence? 
57. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 5 (“Roberts’s quirky definition of the mandate as a tax
likely won’t have lasting jurisprudential impact. His narrow reading of the Commerce Clause, on 
the other hand, could well resurface in other cases as a potent tool to undercut regulatory statutes. 
What many saw as a conservative defeat thus in the long run might be the opposite.”). 
59. Doug Kendall & Brianne Gorod, Why the Roberts Court Is Less Conservative Than You
Think, WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/posteverything/wp/2014/06/25/the-roberts-court-is-way-less-conservative-than-you-think/. 
60. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
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Nor has the Roberts Court been especially eager to sweep away 
precedent. While many Supreme Court advocates called for the 
Court to overturn various precedents during the 2013–14 Term, the 
Court consistently declined to do so.61 Of course, a Court may 
uphold a precedent while interpreting it in far narrower way than had 
previously been understood. Indeed, this article argues below that the 
Roberts Court did exactly that in several cases this term, all in ways 
that resulted in conservative outcomes.62 
One thing that is clear is that the conservative cases received far 
more press coverage, which might explain the perception that the 
Court is so conservative that liberals should simply avoid it. For 
example, the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby63 received 
enormous press attention. That case allowed closely held, for-profit 
corporations to decline on religious grounds to offer employees 
insurance that covers all of the contraceptives it was required to 
cover under the Affordable Care Act.64 A search of the Lexis NEWS 
database for “Hobby Lobby and Contraceptives” produced 1723 hits, 
many of which discussed the case extensively. By contrast, a similar 
search for “Homer City and Supreme Court” (The 2013–14 Court’s 
leading environmental case) produced only ninety-seven hits, mostly 
discussing the case tangentially, if at all. 
In fact, many of the Court’s conservative decisions during the 
last term involved issues that typically generate a great deal of media 
interest—affirmative action, church and state, campaign finance, as 
well as reproductive freedom. This may result in a perception that the 
Court produces consistently conservative decisions. 
This leads to the most likely explanation for why the Roberts 
Court is often seen as so consistently right-leaning. When one looks 
at how the Court has responded this term to the claims of racial and 
religious minorities, as well as women, the Court has been largely 
unsympathetic. The Court has also turned an aggressively 
61. See, Adam Liptak, Roberts’s Incremental Approach Frustrates Supreme Court Allies,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/us/supreme-court-shows 
-restraint-in-voting-to-overrule-precedents.html.
62. Readers may note that this article’s tone in Part B, critiquing a subset of the Court’s
conservative decisions, is more critical than the tone of Part A setting out the Court’s more liberal 
decisions. This is because the point of Part A is to encourage a more nuanced critique of the 
Court by pointing out its liberal tendencies and also because the decisions in Part B do, in some 
cases, seem to narrow precedent in a way that the cases in Part A do not. 
63. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
64. Id. at 2759–60.
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unsympathetic ear to concerns about wealthy individuals and 
corporations dominating the political process. Further, these 
decisions reflect broader trends in the Roberts Court’s decision-
making, as will be discussed below. While liberals and progressives 
also care about issues such as the environment, digital privacy, gun 
control, and capital punishment, any Court that consistently rules 
against racial and religious minorities and women, and consistently 
rules in favor of wealthy campaign donors, is, understandably, bound 
to draw substantial fire from much of the media. 
B. The Roberts Court and Its “Blind Spots”
 In 2014, Justice Ginsburg suggested that the male justices had a 
“blind spot” regarding the concerns of women.65 Looking at the 
Court’s 2013–14 Term, it is possible to conclude that the Court’s 
blind spots further extend to the concerns of racial and religious 
minorities and to those concerned about the influence of great wealth 
on the electoral process. A discussion of each of these issues follows. 
1. Race
In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,66 the 
Roberts Court upheld Michigan’s Proposal 2, which amended the 
state constitution to read: 
The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, 
Wayne State University, and any other public college or 
university, community college, or school district shall not 
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public 
employment, public education or public contracting.67 
The Court upheld the amendment against a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge.68 The plaintiffs argued that the Michigan amendment ran 
afoul of the “political process doctrine,” which prohibits the 
changing of the political process in a way that makes it more difficult 
65. Sean Sullivan, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg Says Male Justices Have a ‘Blind Spot’ on
Women’s Issues, WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (July 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/07/31/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-says-male-justices-have-a-blind 
-spot-on-womens-issues/.
66. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
67. Id. at 1629.
68. Id. at 1638.
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for racial minorities to achieve their goals.69 The argument is 
straightforward. A group that favors preferential admission for 
athletes, alumni, or most groups could achieve these goals by merely 
persuading the right elected officials. However, minorities would 
have to seek another constitutional amendment to reinstate race-
conscious admissions. 
The political process doctrine originated in the case of 
Hunter v. Erickson,70 which struck down an amendment to the city 
charter of Akron Ohio that required voter approval for any city 
ordinance “which regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer, 
listing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of 
any kind or of any interest therein on the basis of race, color, 
religion, national origin or ancestry.”71 The Court held that the 
“State[s] may no more disadvantage any particular group by making 
it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute 
any person’s vote or give any group a smaller representation than 
another of comparable size.”72 
The political process doctrine was applied again in the 1982 
case, Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.73 That case struck 
down an initiative stating: “No school board . . . shall directly or 
indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the school 
which is geographically nearest or next nearest the student’s place of 
residence . . . and which offers the course of study pursued by such 
student . . . .”74 The Court held that the political process doctrine 
forbids political restructuring that “subtly distorts governmental 
processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of 
minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.”75 
The plurality opinion in Shuette upholding the Michigan 
amendment was perhaps less notable for its result (Justice Breyer 
wrote a concurring opinion that would have upheld the Michigan 
amendment on far narrower grounds than the plurality) than it is for 
its reasoning. The plurality eviscerated the political process doctrine 
by changing it from protecting the ability of racial minorities to 
69. Id. at 1626.
70. 393 U.S. 385 (1969); see also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
71. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
72. Id. at 393.
73. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
74. Id. at 462.
75. Id. at 467.
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“achieve beneficial legislation” to prohibiting laws that have “the 
serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on account of 
race.”76 
While the Court gave little guidance on how to apply this 
standard, it is not at all clear that the political process doctrine retains 
any independent vitality after Schuette. After all, laws that impose 
“the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific injuries on 
account of race” presumably invite strict judicial scrutiny under 
regular equal protection analysis.77 Further, while the Court averred 
the decision was “not about the constitutionality, or the merits, of 
race-conscious admissions policies in higher education,”78 the 
Court’s view that the fact that many of the minority applicants who 
would have gained admission to the state’s top universities no longer 
would be able to do so is a not a “specific injury on account of race,” 
says a great deal about how the Court regards affirmative action.  
Indeed, Schuette is only the latest of a string of Roberts Court 
decisions demonstrating a deep hostility to race-conscious policies. 
In 2007, Justice Roberts set the tone for the Court, striking down a 
pair of race-conscious school desegregation plans, declaring: “The 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”79 Since then, the Court has 
consistently ruled against proactive attempts to combat race 
discrimination. In Fisher v. University of Texas,80 the Roberts Court 
vacated a decision by the Fifth Circuit upholding the University of 
Texas Austin’s partly race-based affirmative action program, holding 
that the Circuit Court had not been strict enough in its examination of 
the constitutionality of the program.81 The Supreme Court faulted the 
Fifth Circuit for the feebleness of its inquiry, averring, “Strict 
scrutiny must not be strict in theory but feeble in fact.”82 
76. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (2014).
77. This turns on the question of how the phrase “serious risk, if not purpose, of causing
specific injuries on account of race” is interpreted by future courts. If it means nothing more than 
a law’s unintended disparate impact on a racial group, then the political process doctrine would 
provide racial minorities protection over and above what they receive otherwise. See, e.g., 
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). However, that does not 
seem to be the most obvious interpretation of what the Roberts Court means by that term. 
78. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630.
79. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 51 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
80. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2421.
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A few years earlier the Court also heightened the statutory 
standard an employer must meet in order to discard a promotion test 
that resulted in no African Americans being eligible for promotion. 
In Ricci v. DeStefano,83 the Roberts Court held that the City of New 
Haven had violated the 1964 Civil Rights Act by declining to certify 
the results of a promotion exam that it considered racially 
discriminatory.84 The Court held that the City’s good faith belief that 
the test was discriminatory was not a sufficient basis to discard the 
results.85 Rather the City would have to demonstrate “a strong basis 
in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable 
under [Title VII for] disparate-impact.”86 Also, in 
Shelby County v. Holder,87 the Court struck down the preclearance 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.88 The consequences of that 
holding have been wide spread, including passage of strict voter 
identification laws, restrictions on early voting, and reductions in the 
window of time for voter registration, all of which would have 
required preclearance by the Justice Department prior to the 
Shelby County decision.89 
2. Religious Minorities
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,90 the Supreme Court upheld a 
town’s practice of opening town council meetings with prayer 
sessions, almost all lead by Christian ministers.91 As the Court 
described it, “some of the ministers spoke in a distinctly Christian 
idiom; and a minority invoked religious Holidays, scripture or 
doctrine . . . .” The Court offered the following example: 
Lord, God of all creation, we give you thanks and praise for 
your presence and action in the world. We look with 
anticipation to the celebration of Holy Week and Easter. It 
is in the solemn events of next week that we find the very 
heart and center of our Christian faith. We acknowledge the 
83. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 575–76.
86. Id. at 563.
87. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
88. Id. at 2631.
89. See Tomas Lopez, Shelby County: One Year Later, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST.
(June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later. 
90. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
91. Id. at 1813.
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saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross. We draw 
strength, vitality, and confidence from his resurrection at 
Easter. . . . We pray for peace in the world, an end to 
terrorism, violence, conflict, and war. We pray for stability, 
democracy, and good government in those countries in 
which our armed forces are now serving, especially in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. . . . Praise and glory be yours, O Lord, 
now and forever more. Amen.92 
The Court acknowledged that “[c]itizens attend town 
meetings . . . speak on matters of local importance; and petition the 
board for action that may affect their economic interests, such as the 
granting of permits, business licenses, and zoning variances.”93 The 
Court also acknowledged that there were “several occasions where 
audience members were asked to rise for the prayer.”94 Ministers 
also, in full view of the council members who might well know the 
attending citizens by name, sometimes asked those citizens to join in 
the prayer, while some of the council members themselves bowed 
their heads or made the sign of the cross.95 
The Court refused to acknowledge that a reasonable person 
might feel pressure to join in these prayers or, at a minimum, to stand 
or bow their heads while the name of Jesus was invoked. The Court 
dismissed such concerns as simply unreasonable: “It is presumed that 
the reasonable observer is acquainted with this tradition and 
understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public 
proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the place 
of public citizens. . . .”96 
Most significantly, the Court set an extremely high bar, in most 
cases probably impossibly high, for demonstrating the level of 
coercion necessary to successfully challenge such practices.97 As 
noted, the invited prayer givers were overwhelmingly Christian, and 
frequently invoked explicitly Christian imagery, while attendees 
were asked to visibly join in these prayers. And these same citizens 
often had important requests to make of the council members whom 
92. Id. at 1816–17.
93. Id. at 1825.
94. Id. at 1826.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1814.
97. Id. at 1826.
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they were in full and close view of.98 The Court demanded much 
more than this: 
Respondents suggest that constituents might feel pressure to 
join the prayers to avoid irritating the officials who would 
be ruling on their petitions, but this argument has no 
evidentiary support. Nothing in the record indicates that 
town leaders allocated benefits and burdens based on 
participation in the prayer, or that citizens were received 
differently depending on whether they joined the invocation 
or quietly declined.99 
This demand for empirical proof of tit-for-tat retaliation by the 
government against a non-praying citizen is completely 
unprecedented in the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence. 
Many factors go into deciding whether a particular business gets 
something like a zoning variance, and proving that a particular 
business was denied a variance or other benefit as a direct result of 
its owner not crossing his or her chest would be extremely difficult 
absent some sort of “smoking gun” hostile statement by a council 
member. 
The Court was completely unwilling to see the situation from 
the viewpoint of non-Christians. The majority could not imagine that 
any such attendees would feel the slightest bit self-conscious at even 
the prospect of walking out of the room during a prayer: “Should 
nonbelievers choose to exit the room during a prayer they find 
distasteful, their absence will not stand out as disrespectful or even 
noteworthy.”100 
As with Schuette, Town of Greece is part of a larger pattern by 
the Roberts Court. In Salazar v. Buono,101 the Court held that it did 
not violate the establishment clause to maintain a five-foot high Latin 
cross in the Mojave National Preserve by transferring ownership of 
one acre of land to a private group.102 A year earlier, in Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum,103 the Court ruled that a city may accept a 
monument displaying the Ten Commandments in a city park, while 
98. Id. at 1829.
99. Id. at 1826.
100. Id. at 1827.
 101. 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
102. Id. at 701.
103.  555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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rejecting a monument displaying the tenets of a minority religion.104 
In two other cases, the Court limited to near extinction taxpayer 
standing to challenge establishment clause violations.105 
3. Women
In McCullen v. Coakley,106 the Court struck down a 
Massachusetts statute that provided: 
No person shall knowingly enter or remain on a public way 
or sidewalk adjacent to a reproductive health care facility 
within a radius of 35 feet of any portion of an entrance, exit 
or driveway of a reproductive health care facility or within 
the area within a rectangle created by extending the outside 
boundaries of any entrance, exit or driveway of a 
reproductive health care facility in straight lines to the point 
where such lines intersect the sideline of the street in front 
of such entrance, exit or driveway.107 
The law had been enacted because the state legislature had concluded 
that the previous law did not adequately protect women seeking 
abortions—or their doctors—from intimidation and harassment.108 
The previous law had established an eighteen foot buffer zone, 
within which, “no one (other than certain exempt individuals) could 
knowingly approach within six feet of another person—unless that 
person consented—for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, 
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or 
counseling with such other person.”109 The six-foot zone was 
commonly referred to as a “floating” buffer zone.110 
The new, thirty-five foot, buffer zone was challenged by a 
number of persons who regularly attempted to counsel women 
against abortions.111 They contended that they had many fewer 
conversations and distributed many fewer leaflets since the new law 
104. Id. at 463.
105. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); Heien v. Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
106. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 120E½(b) (West 2012), invalidated by McCullen,
134 S. Ct. 2518. 
108. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2525.
109. Id.
110. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997).
111. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2528.
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was enacted.112 The Supreme Court held that, although the law was 
content neutral and that the state’s interests in “public safety, patient 
access to healthcare, and the unobstructed use of public sidewalks 
and roadways” were significant, the new law was not narrowly 
tailored to achieve those ends.113 
One of the most striking aspects of this decision is the lack of 
weight the Court put upon the testimony of police officers who had 
extensive on-the-ground experience at the clinics and who clearly 
stated that they had not been able to protect pregnant women from 
harassment or prevent blockage of clinic entrances prior to the 
enactment of the new law.114 A Boston Police Captain who had 
served as the commanding officer of the district containing the 
Boston Planned Parenthood clinic testified that the prior buffer zone 
law “was extremely difficult . . . to enforce,” and that there “were 
frequent disturbances, including physical jostling.”115 He also 
testified that when both certain pro-life and pro-choice groups were 
both present they would “effectively block the door.”116 According to 
the Captain, “it was difficult for anyone trying to enter or leave the 
facility to do so without coming into physical contact with 
protestors.”117 Another officer, a Detective with thirty-eight years of 
experience on the Boston Police Force testified: “Before the 
amended buffer zone law took effect, it was very difficult for the 
police . . . to determine when the law was being violated . . . Since 
the amended buffer zone law took effect, the atmosphere outside the 
clinic has been much more orderly. There have been fewer 
confrontations between the protestors and people walking to the 
clinic. . . . The fixed zone makes it possible for us to be sure when 
the law is being violated.”118 
Another striking feature of McCullen is how readily accepting 
the Court was of the unproven assertions of the pro-life counselors. 
For example, the Court recited Ms. McCullen’s testimony that 
having to stop abruptly at the border of the buffer zone “causes her to 
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2535.
114. See id. at 2539.
115. Joint Appendix at 122–23, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168).
116. Id. at 123.
117. Id. at 124.
118. Id. at 126.
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appear ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘suspicious.’”119 The juxtaposition with 
the Court’s opinion in Town of Greece is stark. Recall that in that 
case, the Court simply could not believe that a person who walked 
out in the middle of a prayer they had just been asked to join might 
believe that they would not be as effective in pleading their case to 
the town council. Yet the Court readily accepted the pro-life 
counselors’ testimony that the buffer zone diminished their 
effectiveness. 
As with the cases concerning racial and religious minorities, the 
McCullen case is not an isolated instance; it is part of a string of 
cases diminishing the rights of women. In the same term, the Court 
held that closely held, for-profit corporations may decline, on 
religious grounds, to offer female employees insurance that covers 
all of the contraceptives it was required to cover under the 
Affordable Care Act.120 A few years earlier, in 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,121 the Court held that a 
female plaintiff could not pursue her Title VII claim of gender-based 
pay discrimination against her employer because of the statute of 
limitations, even though she had no reasonable way to know of the 
disparities prior to her suit.122 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,123 
the Court held that female employees seeking to sue their employer 
for sex discrimination could not bring their suit as a class action, 
which, given the practical obstacles to single-plaintiff discrimination 
suits, virtually foreclosed most of the women from having their 
claims heard in court.124 In AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen,125 the Court held 
that maternity leave taken prior to the passage of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 could not be considered in calculating 
employee pension benefits.126 
4. Wealth, Corporations, and the Political Process
The Roberts Court has been notoriously hostile to legislative 
attempts to limit the impact of wealthy individuals on the political 
119. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535.
120. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
121. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
122. Id. at 618.
123. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
124. Id. at 2544–45.
125. 556 U.S. 701 (2009).
126. Id. at 701–02.
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process. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,127 it ruled that the 
restrictions on corporate or union-funded television in the period 
before an election amounted to censorship of core political speech 
unless those advertisements explicitly urge a vote for or against a 
particular candidate.128 In Davis v. FEC,129 the Court struck down the 
“Millionaire’s Amendment,” which allowed candidates for Congress 
to raise larger contributions from donors, if their opponents spent 
more than $350,000 of their own money in the election.130 Most 
famously, in Citizens United v. FEC,131 the Court struck down limits 
on “independent expenditures” by corporations and unions.132 The 
year after Citizens United, the Court decided Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club v. Bennett.133 In that case, the Court struck down the 
part of the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, which gave public 
money to candidates who agreed to limit their personal spending to 
$500, participate in at least one debate, and which gave candidates 
more money based on the amounts spent by privately financed 
opponents and by independent groups supporting them.134 The 
following year in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock,135 the 
Court struck down Montana’s ban on corporate political spending 
despite extensive findings that outside spending was threatening 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.136 
The 2013–14 Term was no exception to this trend. In 
McCutcheon v. FEC,137 the Court struck down a federal limit on 
“aggregate contribution” limits, i.e., the amount one contributor can 
give in federal elections to all candidates, political parties, and PACs, 
combined.138 This was a major development, because the Court had 
never before struck down a federal contribution limit, as opposed to 
limits on independent spending. The logic of the decision was that, 
127. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
128. Id. at 449–50.
129. 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
130. Id. at 724–26.
131. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
132. Id.
133. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
134. Id. at 2809, 2814.
135. 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
136. Id. at 2491.
137. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
138. Id.
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unlike a single large donation to a specific candidate, large aggregate 
donations do not have the same potential for quid pro quo corruption. 
II. CONCLUSION
Despite what one might expect from the conventional media 
wisdom, the Court’s 2013–14 Term is not easily described by a 
single phrase such as liberal or conservative. 
In that term the Court demonstrated numerous liberal tendencies: 
• a desire to reign in excesses of capital punishment;
• a willingness to broadly interpret laws allowing the
government to protect people against pollution;
• a willingness to enforce reasonable restrictions on gun
possession;
• a sensitivity to issues of privacy in an age of rapid
technological change;
• a concern for protecting whistleblowers;
• an openness to protecting the rights of criminal defendants
across a  range of constitutional areas.
On the other hand, in 2013–14, the Court repeatedly ruled 
against the claims of women, racial and religious minorities, and 
those seeking to limit the influence of the wealthy on the political 
process. Even with regard to these issues though, the Court has 
already shown in its most recent term that it is open to siding with 
women and minorities under the right circumstances. In the 2014–15 
Term, the Court overruled the Tenth Circuit, which had granted 
summary judgment in favor of an employer that was being sued for 
intentional discrimination against a Muslim woman.139 The 
employer, Abercrombie and Fitch, declined to hire an otherwise 
qualified Muslim woman because she wore a headscarf that they saw 
as violating their “no caps” policy. The Tenth Circuit ruled in 
Abercrombie’s favor because “ordinarily an employer cannot be 
liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice 
until the applicant (or employee) provides the employer with actual 
knowledge of his need for an accommodation.”140 
139. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
140. Id. at 2031.
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In an opinion written by Justice Scalia but joined by all the 
Court’s more liberal members, the Supreme Court reversed: 
Abercrombie’s primary argument is that an applicant cannot 
show disparate treatment without first showing that an 
employer has “actual knowledge” of the applicant’s need 
for an accommodation. We disagree. Instead, an applicant 
need only show that his need for an accommodation was a 
motivating factor in the employer’s decision.141 
In the same term the Court also significantly expanded the class 
of women who can sue their employers for pregnancy discrimination. 
Overruling the Fourth Circuit, the Court held: “In our view, the Act 
requires courts to consider the extent to which an employer’s policy 
treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats nonpregnant 
workers similar in their ability or inability to work.”142 The Court 
also unanimously overruled the Eighth Circuit, holding that Muslim 
prisoners have the right to grow a half-inch beard despite various 
stated security concerns.143 
Further, although, it was not an issue in the 2013–14 Term, the 
Court has shown a strong concern for the equality and dignity of 
same-sex persons and couples144. At the time of this writing, the 
Court had not yet ruled on the issue of the constitutionality of 
same-sex marriage, but the ark of their reasoning so far indicates a 
strong likelihood that they will rule in favor of same-sex couples 
who wish to marry. 
 Perhaps one way to describe the Roberts Court’s pattern is that 
it has a cramped view of what constitutes an injury. Unless it sees 
proof that a legislator was all but bribed by a campaign donation or 
that a non-praying citizen was directly retaliated against by the city 
council, the Court sees no injury. Unless a racial minority can 
demonstrate a specific act of racism, the Court sees no injury in the 
elimination of affirmative action or the use of a test that promotes no 
African Americans. But the Court has no trouble seeing the injury 
that comes from specific government retaliation against whistle-
blowers or from the federal government’s refusal to grant specific 
141. Id.
142. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015).
143. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
144.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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federal benefits to a same-sex marriage that is legal under state law. 
Indeed, while the Roberts Court can hardly be said to be a friendly 
venue for women’s rights, it has consistently ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs when the context has been a claim of employer retaliation 
against employees alleging gender discrimination or sexual 
harassment.145 
Of course, the Court’s complex pattern of decision-making is 
not likely to be susceptible to any single all-purpose explanation. The 
Court has always satisfied, disappointed, and sometimes infuriated 
various Court watchers. The 2013–14 Term was no exception, nor 
are its subsequent terms likely to be. 
145. See Brianne Gorod, Roberts at 10: Roberts’s Quiet, But Critical, Votes to Limit Women’s
Rights, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs 
/Roberts-at-10-Roberts-Quiet-But-Critical-Votes-To-Limit-Womens-Rights.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2015). 
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